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The emergence of the ideologies of 'moral murder' is one of the conditions for 
the escalation of ethnic conflicts into ethnic cleansing or a genocide1.  By studying the 
social construction of Albanians in Serbian political discourse and the corresponding 
state policies, this article fills some of the gap in the existing knowledge on the 
treatment of Albanians by the Serbian and Yugoslav state in the period before the 
Second World War. 2 The troubled incorporation of the Albanian minority into the 
Serbian state, when compared with similar nation-state building processes in the 
Balkans, enables us to reassess and extend Hroch's theory of the rise of minority 
nationalisms in Eastern Europe.  
An elite's visions of minority populations and state policies cannot alone 
explain the opening or closing of the opportunities for ethnic cleansing.3 However, 
they do enable us to understand why and how the political elite might try to pursue 
such opportunities. The evolution of the Serbian vision and policies towards the 
Albanians was influenced by wider European nation-building models, as well as by 
the clientelistic relationship with some of the Great Powers. The Serbian elite faced a 
fundamental tension between an uncritically accepted model of the homogeneous 
national-state and the complex multi-ethnic reality of the Balkans. Since the 
entrenched Serbian visions of the Albanian Muslims were particularly negative, the 




1804 - 1839: The Liberation and the Cleansing of Serbia of Muslims 
 
The First Serbian Uprising (1804-1813) created the first Serbian political 
authority that had to deal with a Muslim question on its territory. 4 The Uprising was 
initially a local rebellion that only gradually escalated into a struggle for national 
independence from the Ottoman Empire. The immediate goal of the rebels was to end 
the arbitrary and repressive regime of Dahije, 5 but they also felt a preexisting 
animosity towards Muslims.  Matija Nenadović, one of the leaders of the uprising, 
wrote down the last message he received from his father -- who was taken as a 
prisoner and soon murdered during the execution of the notables:6 'Say to him 
[Matija] that neither he nor any of my people should ever again believe the Turks.'7  
Extant class hatred of the Serbian peasants towards urban Muslim merchants and 
nobility was clearly a major motivator for mass violence. 8 Nenadović describes the 
take-over of the Valjevo township by the Serbian rebels: 
At that time in Valjevo there were twenty-four mosques and it was said that there 
were nearly three thousand Turkish and some two hundred Christian houses.... 
Any house that had not been burnt the Serbs tore to bits and took their windows and 
doors and everything else that could be removed.   9 
 
Nenadović indicated that the Serb rebels had a clear awareness of the Kosovo 
myth, 10 but at this point the awareness did not seem to transfer into any clear 
territorial agenda per se. Nenadović's text has occasional references to the epics of the 
Kosovo battle.  Still, he seems to interpret them as a symbolic and inspirational story 
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of a 'golden age', its heroes, and the fall of a civilization, rather than as a call for the 
'liberation' of Kosovo.  A major Serbian national intellectual and participant in the 
Uprising Vuk Karadžić, even wondered whether the whole of Kosovo 11 should be 
seen as a part of Serbia or Albania.12  Furthermore, independence from the Ottoman 
Empire was initially not even proposed, not only because it was clearly beyond reach 
without major support from a Great Power, but also because a number of leaders 
could still remember a fairly good life before the Dahije and under the rule of the 
Hadži Mustafa Pasha.  Karđorđe Petrović and other rebel leaders escalated their goals 
and the Serbian forces began to attack all the 'Turkish' settlements, not just the Dahije 
and their allies13.  
Dositej Obradović, an educated and influential Serb who established the first 
secular school in free Serbia in 1808 and became Serbia's first Minister of Education 
in 1811, pleaded in vain to the leaders of the Uprising not to attack the 'peaceful 
Turks.' In a letter written to the leaders in 1806, Obradović acknowledged that the 
Turkish soldiers and feudal lords could not be allowed to stay in the Serbian state. 
However, he also urged that:  
...all those Turks who supports themselves and do not want to rule over the raya 
[Christians] you should allow to live peacefully in their homes, like they did before, 
just put them under your rule....[a]nd spread among them your language, knowledge, 
and literature. 14   
 
Despite such humanistic pleas, the First Uprising and several other failed 
Christian uprisings in the period of Ottoman decline seem to follow a pattern of 
escalating violence.  Oppression and lawlessness triggered an uprising that escalated 
into killing, plundering, and burning of Muslim settlements. The Ottoman 
reinforcements soon arrived, crushed the rebels, committed various crimes, burned 
villages, and re-established Ottoman rule. 15  It is significant that the Serb rebels were 
trying to permanently cleanse the Muslims, while the Ottoman forces engaged in 
exemplary repression, aimed at teaching the Serbs a lesson but without driving them 
out through permanent mass expulsion into the Austrian Empire. 16   Why did their 
actions differ?  
Arguably there was a class hatred, 17 as the Ottomans perceived the Christian 
peasants as a source of tax revenue and forced labour, while the Serb peasants saw the 
mostly urban Muslims as a generally useless class of 'gluttons' [izjelice] as some of 
the Muslims were referred to in the Serbian folk epic song that describes the First 
Uprising.  18 Another factor leading to the Serbs' eliminationist attempts might be the 
inspiring influence of Austrian policies towards the Muslims in the newly acquired 
territories. As Ivo Goldstein puts it, traces of signs of Ottoman rule 'disappeared as 
mosques and other structures were pulled down…' 19 In addition, the Muslim presence 
in the cities was justifiably perceived as a source of internal threat in the event of an 
Ottoman counter-attack. 20 The perception of urban Muslims as the economic 
exploiters and as a major security threat was not auspicious for the other Muslims that 
would soon be included in the expanding Serbian state.   
 
Different Visions of National Identity and State Formation. 
 
 In the emerging Serbian national state there were also proponents of religious 
tolerance. One of them was Ilija Garašanin (1812-1874), who served as Minister of 
Internal Affairs and then Minister of Foreign Affairs. 21  While Garašanin's 1844 
Načertanije explicitly defines the re-establishment of the Serbian Empire 22 as the 
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primary national goal23,  he simultaneously advocated religious freedoms, in order to 
make a union with Serbia more attractive for Bosnian Catholics and Muslims: 24  
... Serbia has to be the natural protector of all the Turkish Slavs, and if she  
genuinely takes this role upon herself, the other Slavs will allow her to  
speak and act in their name. If Serbia showed to her neighbors that she only  
thinks of herself, and ignores the ill fortune and needs of others, they would  
not listen to her and thus instead of unity there would be mistrust, envy  
and misfortune. 25  
 
Garašanin advocated that Serbia should gain access to -- not occupy/liberate -- 
some of the Albanian sea ports. 26 This would imply that he does not see Albania as a 
future part of the Serbian state. Interestingly, Garašanin does not mention Kosovo 
once in his Načertanije. This is particularly important in light of the more recent 
nationalist claims of the primeval sanctity of Kosovo as the 'sacred Serbian land'.  
Looking at the writings of Nenadović, Karadžić or Garašanin, it does not appear that 
Serbian intellectuals and politicians embraced a religious claim to Kosovo until very 
late in the 19th century or even early in the 20th century.  
  
In 1847 The Mountain Wreath by Petar Petrović Njegoš 27 was published.  It is 
a work of indisputable literary value, while still containing passages which reflect his 
negative attitude towards the 'Islamicized' Slavs. As Njegoš put it, they are the 
'disgusting traitors' [pogani izrodi]  who 'denied the faith of the forefathers.' 28 Their 
existence was thus incompatible with a Christian Montenegrin state: the Muslims a 
'snake within our breast', a 'devil in our Christian land'.  29 For their own good, they 
must return to their authentic, original, 'European' path. 30 Thus, the solution of the 
Muslim question was supposed to come through coercive conversion.  
 
However, those who refused to convert wasted their chance to join the nation. 
For their -- repeated -- treacherous behavior they would be punished with expulsion or 
murder. Montenegrin land must be 'cleansed' of the non-Christians [očišćena od 
nekrsti]. 31  As the Montenegrin Bishop in the poem proclaimed, 'those who 
blasphemed the Holy Name of Christ we will baptize, with water or with blood!' 32   
Building on the tradition of intolerance, Njegoš dedicated The Mountain Wreath to 
the Serbian leader Karađorđe, who 'cleansed' Serbia of Muslims during the First 
Uprising. Thus, he attached his own work to the pre-existing eliminationist ideas and 
practices.  
The inspiration for Njegoš's work was in actual historical developments. After 
the Ottoman defeats in Central Europe and general decline of the Ottoman power in 
the second half of the 18th century, Montenegrin peasants began organized attacks on 
the local Slavic Muslim settlers, who gradually withdrew into the lowlands and the 
urban areas. 33 Njegoš's poem probably describes a major Montenegrin attack on the 
local Muslims that seems to have occurred on Christmas Eve of 1709. 34 While some 
Muslims managed to escape, many Muslim men were killed, and their women and 
children were coercively converted. 35  
 Still, it is important to avoid simplistic or singular interpretations of Njegoš's 
work and life. Calling Gorski Vijenac -- one of the most complex and finest literary 
works in the Montenegrin and Serbian literature  -- a 'hymn to genocide' -- is about as 
fair as labeling Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice -- an 'ode to anti-Semitism.'  As the 
political and religious leader of Montenegro, Njegoš worked to reduce the tensions 
between the Christian Montenegrin tribes and the neighboring Muslim populations. 36 
Moreover, in his actual diplomatic correspondence with Osman-Pasha Skopljak, one 
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cannot fail to see Njegoš's profound individual struggle to come to some meaningful 
reconciliation with the Slavic Muslims. Njegoš writes how much he misses all the 
Serb nobility that converted to Islam, how hard it is for him to see his Montenegrins at 
constant war with their own 'islamicized brothers' [braćom isturčenom], that he would 
love 'more than anything else in the world' to see the unity [slogu] among the 
brothers. He writes to Skopljak, who was a Bosniac:   
 
When you speak to me as my brother Bosniac, I am your brother and your friend, but 
when you speak as an alien, as an Asian, as an enemy of our people and our name,  
I cannot accept that [meni je to protivno] and no reasonable man could accept that. 37 
 
Despite Njegoš's genuine desire to think of a way to incorporate the Slavic 
Muslims into the Serbian/Montenegrin state, the central element of his thinking 
remains that the Muslims -- seen as a residue of the Ottoman and 'Asiatic' imperial 
subjugation -- could not be allowed to exist in the liberated, European, and Christian 
Balkan states. Tragically, his work fuses the commitment to the national liberation 
with extreme intolerance towards the Balkan Muslims.   
 
1878: A 'Model' Ethnic Cleansing? 
 
 In 1878, following a series of Christian uprisings against the Ottoman Empire, 
the Russo-- Turkish war, and the Berlin Congress, Serbia gained complete 
independence, as well as new territories in the Toplica and Kosanica regions adjacent 
right next to Kosovo.38  These two regions had a sizable Albanian population which 
the Serbian government decided to deport. 39  The Serbian Army Commander insisted 
that Serbia 'should not have its Caucasus' and the Prime Minister argued that the 
Albanian minority might represent a security concern. 40  
 
In 1909, Serbian intellectual Jovan Hadži-Vasiljević explained that the major 
motivation for the 1878 deportation was also to 'create a pure Serbian nation state' by 
'cleansing' the land of the non-Christians, as 'the great Serbian poet Njegoš argued'.41  
Hadži-Vasiljević was here interpreting Njegoš rather loosely, as Njegoš's work 
focused on the Slavic Muslims and not on Albanian Muslims. The ominous 
implication was that Albanians, as non-Slavs, were not even capable of assimilation. 
While the Serbian state authorities repeatedly attempted to assimilate the Slavic 
Muslims, they refrained from attempting to 'Serbianize' he Albanians.42  While both 
security concerns and the exclusive nationalist ideology influenced the government's 
policies, there was also some Serbian resistance to the 'cleansing' of the Albanians. 
General Jovan Belimarković opposed the deportation and offered his resignation to 
the government over this issue 43 and journalist Manojlo Đorđević also condemned 
these policies and argued that Serbia should have pursued a policy of peaceful 
reconciliation towards the Albanians:  
In Toplica the Albanians were encountered, and we had nothing more important to do 
but to expel these warlike, but hard working people from their homes. Instead of 
making a peace with them as the defeated side – they were without any good reason 
pushed across the border -- so that they'll settle on the other side as the enemies of 
everything Serbian, to become the avengers towards those who pushed them from 
their homes. 44  
 
Despite some voices of dissent, the Serbian regime 'encouraged' about 71,000 
Muslims, including 49,000 Albanians 'to leave.' 45 The regime then gradually settled 
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Serbs  and Montenegrins in these territories. 46 Prior to 1878, the Serbs comprised not 
more than one half of the population of Niš, the largest city in the region; by 1884 the 
Serbian share rose to  80 %. 47 According to Ottoman sources, Serbian forces also 
destroyed mosques in Leskovac, Prokuplje, and Vranje. 48  
  
The 'cleansing' of Toplica and Kosanica would have long-term negative 
effects on Serbian-Albanian relations. The Albanians expelled from these regions 
moved over the new border to Kosovo, where the Ottoman authorities forced the Serb 
population out of the border region and settled the refugees there. 49 Janjićije Popović, 
a Kosovo Serb community leader in the period prior to the Balkan Wars, noted that 
after the 1876-78 wars, the hatred of the Turks and Albanians towards the Serbs 
'tripled' 50.  A number of Albanian refugees from Toplica region, radicalized by their 
experience, engaged in retaliatory violence against the Serbian minority in Kosovo. 51 
In 1900 Živojin Perić, a Belgrade Professor of Law, noted that in retrospect, 'this 
unbearable situation probably would not have occurred had the Serbian government 
allowed Albanians to stay in Serbia'. He also argued that conciliatory treatment 
towards Albanians in Serbia could have helped the Serbian government to gain the 
sympathies of Albanians of the Ottoman Empire. 52  
 
Thus, while both humanitarian concerns and Serbian political interests would 
have dictated conciliation and moderation, the Serbian government, motivated by 
exclusive nationalist and anti-Muslim sentiments, chose expulsion. The 1878 
cleansing was a turning point because it was the first gross and large scale injustice 
committed by Serbian forces against the Albanians. From that point onward, both 
ethnic groups had recent experiences of massive victimization that could be used to 
justify 'revenge' attacks. Furthermore, Muslim Albanians had every reason to resist 
the incorporation into the Serbian state.  
  
Particularly ominous was that some Serbian intellectuals later concluded that 
the 1878 model 'worked' and that it should be reproduced elsewhere. In 1917, during 
the Corfu negotiations with Ante Trumbić and other Croat politicians on the future of 
Bosnia, Serbian politician Stojan Protić reportedly stated that the Serbs have a violent 
solution for Bosnia, which was conversion or extermination of Slavic Muslims. 53 
While the actual Serbian policies after the liberation/take-over of Bosnia in 1918 were 
not nearly that extreme, Protić' ideas are a sign that an important section of the 
Serbian elite saw the 1878 cleansing as 'normal' way to solve the 'Muslim question' in 
the Balkans.  By 1937 a leading Serbian intellectual Vaso Čubrilović argued that the 
'model cleansing' of Toplica and Kosanica regions in 1878 should be reproduced 
against the Kosovo Albanians.  
 
1878 -- 1912: The Persecution of Kosovo Serbs and Hardening of Anti-Albanian 
Resentment in Serbia  
 
Following the Ottoman defeat in the 1878 war, Muslim Albanians faced an 
increasingly dangerous political environment. Kosovo townships were full of 
thousands of Muslim refugees expelled from the territories captured by Serbia. 54   
The Treaty of San Stefano between Ottoman and Russian Empire envisioned the 
creation of a Greater Bulgarian state that would encompass territories with a large 
Albanian presence.55 The Albanian leadership responded to these challenges by 
forming the Albanian League in Prizren in June 1878, which demanded the creation 
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of an Albanian territorial autonomous unit within the Ottoman Empire, which was to 
include ethnically mixed regions, such as Kosovo and Macedonia. 56   
 
While the League was soon suppressed by the Ottoman authorities, these 
demands reflected a complex position of the Muslim Albanians in the collapsing 
Ottoman Empire. The Muslim-dominated Ottoman Empire provided considerable 
opportunities for the Muslim Albanians. 57 A number of Albanian chieftains rose to 
high positions in the Ottoman service, such as a Muhammad Ali, pasha of Egypt, or 
Ali Pasha of Janina.  58 In light of the religious cleansings by Orthodox nationalists in 
Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro, the defense and preservation of the 
Ottoman Empire seemed as the best way to protect Muslim security and privileges. 59 
At the same time, the Ottoman regime was increasingly trying to implement some 
elements of the West European 'nation building' models. A component of the 
nationalization policies was the attempt to 'Turkicize' the Muslim ethnic groups within 
the Empire. 60  Thus, while various potentially irredentist Christian minorities were 
allowed to establish their own schools, the Ottoman authorities banned not only 
Albanian-language schools but -- after 1902 -- even private correspondence in 
Albanian. 61 
 
Not surprisingly, Kosovo Muslim Albanians strongly resisted the Tanzimat 
reforms and then the Young Turks' push for religious equality which further eroded  
the remaining Muslim privileges. 62 To add an insult to injury, the Young Turk regime 
also intensified attempts to assimilate Muslim Albanians into the 'Ottoman nation.' 63 
In 1908 and 1912, Kosovo Albanian Muslims revolted against the new Constitution 
that guaranteed religious equality. Instead, they demanded the return to the Islamic 
Law and the exemption from taxation. 64   
 
The most vulnerable of all, caught in the middle of the struggle between the 
declining Empire and the rising nationalist states and movements, were the Kosovo 
Serbs and the Catholic Albanians. Their old feudal duties towards the Muslim lords 65 
seemed even heavier after the peasants in neighboring Serbia were freed from these 
obligations. 66 The Muslim Albanian population was using its privileged position -- 
including the right to bear arms, denied to Christians -- to put pressure on the Catholic 
Albanians to convert. 67 Edith Durham reported that 'the Albanians are almost solely 
Albanophone, whereas the scattered Serbs usually speak both languages, and when 
addressed in Serb often replied first in Albanian'. 68  The anti-Serbian anger of the 
Albanian Muslims cleansed from Serbia in 1878 combined with the lack of will of the 
local Ottoman authority to protect the Christians from the loyal Muslims, created 
increasingly hostile and insecure environment for the local Serb population.  Even the 
clearly Albanophile Durham noted that Albanian militants were using 'medieval 
methods, for this is the Land of the Living Past, ' to push the Serbs out. 69 From 1880 
to 1889, more than 60,000 Serbs moved from European Turkey to Serbia. 70 Jovan 
Cvijić estimated that from 1876 to 1912, 150,000 Serbs from Sandžak and Kosovo 
moved to Serbia. 71 
 
Just as the 1878 cleansing fed the anti-Serbian sentiments and Albanian 
nationalism, the 1878-1912 discrimination, abuse, and exodus of the Serb minority 
fed the anti-Albanian feelings and Serbian nationalism. An 1899 Memorandum of 
Serbian leaders from Kosovo and Macedonia claimed that 'The Serbs of the Kosovo 
vilayet live like beings without any rights, as a flock of sheep without a guardian, 
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under the paws of wild Albanian animals.' 72 Kosovo Serb leader Janjićije Popović 
described the movement of Albanian settlers into previously homogenously Serbian 
villages as a 'cancer.' 73 Some of the officials of the Serbian Ministry of Foreign 
affairs used similar language in official correspondence, describing Albanians as a 
'wild tribe' 74 with 'cruel instincts.' 75 
 
Enraged by the persecutions of the Kosovo Serbs, a number of Serbian 
intellectuals and journalists joined the angry hate propaganda that seemed to 
culminate during the preparations for the Balkan Wars. In 1912 Serbian demographer 
Jovan Cvijić argued that 'there is a general consensus that the Albanians are the most 
barbarous tribes of Europe.' 76  One Serbian intellectual of this period described the 
Albanians as 'European Indians' and 'lazy savages,' and even claimed that in 'the 
Albanian language there is no word for love.'  77 
 
Still, in the middle of the rising anger towards the Albanians, some Serbian 
intellectuals and political activists spoke against the hegemonic discourse. Dimitrije 
Tucović, a leader of the Serbian social-democrats, developed a strong critique of anti-
Albanian stereotypes and rising Serbian imperial ambitions. Tucović found inspiration 
in the writings of the Montenegrin-Serbian tribal leader, Marko Miljanov (1833-1901) 
who described Montenegrin- Albanian cooperation and friendly relations and called 
on the Serbs and Montenegrins to realize their similarities with Albanians.78  Tucović 
and Serbian Social Democrats 79 were also inspired by the German Social 
Democracy's critique of German and Austrian imperialism. However, unlike the 
German SDP, Serbian Social Democrats voted against the military budget in 1914. 
Like some of their Russian counterparts, the Serbian Social-Democrats were among 
the most truly international of all Marxist parties. 80  
 
Tucović and the Social Democrats were already able to see something that 
President Wilson and many others were to realize much later: in the regions with 
complex ethnic composition and multi-layered cultural identities there was simply no 
way to apply the principle of self-determination without creating new injustices. 
Tucović pointedly asked: 'Who will then establish the boundary line between the 
Serbians and Bulgarians?  How could all Macedonian Slavs be brought into one state 
without at the same time enslaving the Greeks and the other peoples?' 81 Tucović 
criticized the propaganda of those Serbian newspapers and intellectuals 'who have 
proclaimed that the Albanians are wild and superfluous inhabitants of the Balkan 
peninsula and that it is the duty of the Serbian people to remove them from this 
world.'82 
Instead of fatal project of the quasi-independent, ethnically cleansed, and 
mutually hostile national states, Serbian Social Democrats advocated the 
establishment of a federation of Balkan peoples. They hoped that a Balkan Federation 
would prevent the imperial intrusions of the European powers and contain interethnic 
conflicts. 83 They tried to forge better cooperation among socialists in the region and 
organized the First Conference of Balkan social democratic parties, held in Belgrade 
January 7-9, 1910. 84  
Tucović was also explicit in his rejection of the dominant anti-Albanian 
sentiments: 'Other Balkan peoples have no interest in living in hostility with the 
Albanians. The union is a salvation for all of them. And in that union there is a place 
for Albanians, too.'85 Abdul Frasheri, one of the leaders of Albanian cultural and 
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political national movement, also argued that the union of an Albanian state in a 
Balkan Confederation would serve Albanian interests. 86 
Unfortunately, this was not to be. Some elements of the idea of Balkan 
solidarity also existed in official Serbian state policy, but it was combined with 
nationalist ambitions and the tradition of intolerance towards the Muslims of the 
Balkans. During the preparation for the Balkan Wars, Serbian Prime Minister Nikola 
Pašić proclaimed his commitment to the anti-imperial solidarity of the Balkan 
national states (encapsulated in the 'Balkan for the Balkan peoples' slogan) and 
support for ethnographic boundaries among the Balkan states. 87  
While preparing for the Balkan wars, the Montenegrin state established 
military cooperation with the Catholic Albanians, concentrated in Northern Albania. 
88 Greece pursued a fairly successful assimilationist policy towards the Orthodox 
Albanians in the South. 89 However, the Serbian government was remarkably 
unsuccessful in achieving practically any kind cooperation with the predominately 
Muslim Albanians in Kosovo.  
Milan Rakić, Serbian Consul in Kosovo, offered a meaningful explanation for 
the failure of Serbian attempts to collaborate with Muslim Albanians. According to 
Rakić, Albanian Muslims were intolerant towards Serbian Christians, and, as 
Muslims, they were concerned about losing the religious privileges they enjoyed in 
the Ottoman Empire. They also remembered well the expulsion of the Muslim 
Albanians from Serbia in 1878.90 Despite Rakić' conclusion that the Serbian 
government did not have any chance of achieving a political agreement with the 
Muslim Albanians, in 1912 Prime Minister Pašić offered to the Albanian leaders 
guarantees of religious freedoms and respect for cultural rights in exchange for 
support in the coming Serbian military offensive. As Rakić correctly predicted earlier, 
the Albanian leaders rejected Pašić's offer. 91  
 
Serbian pre-war propaganda represented the Albanians as 'incapable' of 
forming a state on their own, and thus good candidates for the 'civilizing' influence of 
the Serbian state. 92 Conveniently, the 'civilizing mission' of the Serbian state was 
combined with a plan to gain access to the Albanian Adriatic ports by annexing large 
parts of Albania itself. Thus, in a manner characteristic of European imperialism at 
the time, a paternalistic justification for the expansion was combined with the pursuit 
of economic interests. In preparation for the First Balkan War, the Serbian 
government concluded a secret agreement with Bulgaria on the division of the 
territory that promised northern Albania to Serbia.  
 
The Liberations/Conquests of Kosovo: 1912-1924  
The First Balkan War brought surprisingly rapid victories for the Serbian and 
Montenegrin forces and their Bulgarian and Greek allies.  The atrocities committed 
during this war by far overshadowed the 1878 cleansing.  According to Durham's 
reports, the Montenegrin soldiers were telling her that 'when the land is once ours 
there will be no Mohammedan question,' because the Muslims would die or go to 
Asia. 93 Whereas the Montenegrin forces also engaged in forced conversions of 
Catholics and Muslims, the Serbian forces did not even attempt to convert the 
Albanian Muslim population 94 A Serbian journalist later interviewed by Leon 
Trotsky recalled his visit to the region by train following the Serbian offensive: 
'By five pm. we were approaching Kumanovo. The sun had set, it was starting  
to get dark. But the brighter the sky became, the more brightly the fearful  
illumination of the fires stood against it. Burning was going on all around  
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us. Entire Albanian villages have been turned into pillars of fire – far and  
near, right up to the railway line… In all the fiery monotony this picture was  
repeated all the way to Skopje.' 95 
 
The Western observers estimated that approximately 7,000 - 10,000 Albanians 
were killed in the Kumanovo and Priština areas. 96 The agents of the British-
Macedonian Relief Fund estimated that in Province of Monastir (occupied by the Serb 
and Greek forces) about 80% of Muslim villages were burned. 97 Over 25,000 
refugees from Kosovo fled to northern Albania. 98 According to the observers, while 
the local Christian population also engaged in inter-communal violence, the worst 
atrocities against the civilians were usually committed by the paramilitary units. 99 
According to a Serbian officer, the paramilitaries were mostly recruited 'from the 
dregs of society' and have 'made murder, robbery, and violence a savage sport. ' 100  
Another Serbian officer noted that while some paramilitaries were intellectuals and 
'nationalist zealots,' the rest 'had joined the army for the sake of loot.' 101 These units 
systematically killed and plundered Albanian and Turkish shop owners after the fall 
of Skopje. 102  Moreover, regular forces also frequently engaged in the executions of 
the POWs. The Serbian officer whom Trotsky interviewed explained: 'I strictly 
forbade my men to kill them [the POWs] but I must say frankly that this order was not 
obeyed. ' 103 Even the Serbian civilian population took part in the plunder:  
From the area around Vranje the population has crossed en masse into the  
Albanian villages, to pick up whatever may catch their eye. Peasant women  
carry away on their shoulders even the doors and windows of Albanian homes.104 
 
 There was a clear logic in this madness, as the Serbian forces engaged in 
permanent demographic engineering 105 of the population in the region. The Orthodox 
Slavs frequently experienced the arrival of the Serbian units as a liberation, which is 
understandable in light of the repression of the late Ottoman era. On the other hand, 
the armies of the Balkan orthodox states subjected the Muslim Slavs to coercive 
conversions, expulsions, or even murder. After the fall of Sandžak under Montenegrin 
control in 1912, about 13,000 Muslims were forced to convert to Orthodoxy, 
comparable numbers were forced to leave for Bosnia, and the Montenegrins took their 
revenge for the losses suffered during the 1876-1878 uprising. 106  
While the motives of enrichment and 'revenge' were probably omnipresent at 
the level of direct perpetrators, it is important to distinguish them from more 
ideological and long term motivations of the military and the political elite. The 
paramilitaries were probably less motivated by the writings of Hegel or Fichte on the 
nation and history, and more by the hopes of stealing an ox or a cow. Trotsky's 
informers clearly state that the Serbian (and Bulgarian) army officers were also 
encouraging their soldiers with the promises of free land in the newly liberated 
territories. Destruction, plundering, and mass expulsions destroyed the economy and 
the tax base in the newly acquired territories and thus hardly served the economic 
interest of the state institutions. Besides, the very existence of the paramilitaries was 
out of question without the consent, encouragement, supply, and toleration of the 
authorities. When some paramilitary units forgot who set the rules of the game and 
started plundering the Serbian villages as well, they were quickly crushed by the 
regular forces. 107 Thus, Cathie Carmichael seems right to argue that the causes of 
ethnic cleansing policies -- especially at the level of the political elite -- were almost 
entirely ideological. 108 
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Tucović, who was drafted into the Serbian Army prior to the Balkan Wars, 
explained the crimes against Muslims as a part of the eliminationist projects of the 
Balkan states:  
These atrocities were neither initiated by individuals nor were due to personal 
distress, but were a constitutive part of the 'national' programs of the Balkan states. 
The Serbian Army was exterminating Albanians in Old Serbia (Kosovo) and Albania, 
the Bulgarian Army -- the Turks in Thrace, and the Greek Army -- the Turks and the 
Albanians in Devol -- all in the criminal belief that they were attaining a 'national' 
aim -- that by removing these innocent people off the face of the Earth [sa lica 
zemlje] they were removing an enemy with whom they would otherwise have to deal 
in the future. 109 
 
In line with the long-term plan of taking Albanian ports, the Serbian and 
Montenegrin units occupied, and on November 29, 1912, tried to annex large parts of 
northern and central Albania. 110 They were soon forced out by Italy and the Habsburg 
Empire. The Serbian government, having recently committed itself to the principle of 
national self-determination for the Balkan peoples, was now desperately searching for 
an ideological rationale for the annexation of territories where ethnic Albanians were 
an overwhelming majority. In the negotiations with the Austrian representatives and 
later at the London peace conference in January 1913, Serbian Prime Minister Pašić 
argued that many Albanians were Serbs 'by blood', who had changed their religion 
and nationality due to the Ottoman era persecutions. 111  
Pašić further argued that due to the concentration of Serbian religious 
monuments in Metohija (southwestern and overwhelmingly demographically 
Albanian part of the present day Kosovo) this region had been a 'Holy Land of the 
Serbian People…since time immemorial' [oduvek]112  Karadžić, Njegoš and 
Garašanin all failed to make a 'religious' claim on any part of the present day Kosovo. 
Thus, it does appear that the 'Holy Land of the Serbian People' was a relatively recent 
invented tradition, probably formulated in the hope of mobilizing Christian solidarity 
from the Western Powers against the predominantly Muslim Albanians. The use of 
the 'religious' argument enables Pašić to claim for Serbia a part of the present day 
Kosovo that was clearly demographically Albanian.  
Pašić even decided to use the Serbian military to 'arrange' that the local 
Albanian leaders  -- in the disputed areas with large Albanian majority -- 'ask' the 
Great Powers to be left in the Serbian state. In December 1913, the London 
Conference of Ambassadors decided to recognize an independent Albania, with 
borders that were yet to be determined. 113 In response, Pašić promptly sent a letter to 
the Serbian High Command with the following request: 
As soon as you can, if possible tomorrow, try to arrange that the Albanian leaders 
from Peć, Đakovica, Prizren, and Debar send telegrams to London and to ask  
-- in their own name and in front of their communities -- the French, the Italian,  
the Russian, the German, and the Italian ambassadors and Grey [the British Foreign 
Secretary] to leave them in the Serbian state and not to join them to the coastal 
Albania. 114 
 
 This sudden desire to quickly ('if possible tomorrow') manufacture the consent 
of the Albanians for their incorporation into the Serbian state is very interesting since 
in the same time the Serbian Ambassador in Berlin was trying to persuade other 
diplomats that the borders between Serbia and Albania cannot be established by local 
plebiscites 'because the Albanians are not a people for itself [narod za sebe] who 
could vote freely and consciously.' 115 
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Finally, during the diplomatic negotiations, Pašić argued that economic and 
military prerogatives of Serbia demand an access to the sea, as a way to break the 
encirclement by the Habsburg Empire and its allies. 116 This argument seems sincere. 
Since the fall of the Obrenović dynasty in 1903 and the re-orientation of the new 
Serbian government towards France and Russia as the new patrons, the Habsburg 
Empire and the landlocked Serbia were clearly on the collision course. Pašić was 
desperately searching for an access to sea ports that would reduce Serbia's economic 
dependence on the increasingly hostile Habsburg Empire and provide secure supply 
lines for military materials.  While sincere, this argument shows how far the Serbian 
government had departed from its earlier commitment to the principle of national self-
determination for the peoples of the Balkans. Certainly, trampling upon the basic 
interests of putatively inferior peoples was hardly a local specialty. According to 
Tucović, the true inspiration and the model for the Serbian state were the successful 
European imperial powers: 
Serbian capitalists have opened their account of colonial murders and horrors 
and now they can proudly join the capitalist company with the English, the Dutch,  
the French, the Germans, the Italians, and the Russians. 117 
 
While a number of Western journalists did report on the crimes committed by 
the Christian armies, it does not seem that there were major Western diplomatic 
protests against these abuses. Again, it seems that the sense of Christian/European 
solidarity made it very hard to feel sorry for 'the Turks.' Barbara Jelavich observes 
that the major Western European newspapers had a tendency to report the Ottoman 
atrocities against the Balkan Christians and to simply ignore the Christian atrocities 
against the Balkan Muslims. 118 In 1915, the British pro-consul in Egypt wrote: 'We 
are fighting in order that the Turkish hordes, who for 500 years have camped in 
Europe, should be driven back into Asia.' 119  
 From 1914 to 1924, Serbian/Yugoslav troops repeatedly invaded parts of 
Albania. In the winter of 1916-1917, during the Serbian withdrawal through Albania, 
Albanian guerrilla units did not miss an opportunity for revenge attacks against 
Serbian troops. 120 In 1916 and 1917, during the Serbian uprising against the Austrian 
occupation in the Toplica region, the Albanian paramilitaries attacked the Serbian 
rebels. 121 When the Serbian Army returned to Kosovo in 1918, the roles of the 
persecutors and the victims were reversed again.  
At the Paris Peace conference, the Serbian delegation refused to extend the 
minority rights protections on the Albanian minority in Kosovo. In line with the 
'Albanian inferiority' argument, the Chief of the Serbian Military Mission at the peace 
conference suggested that the 'uncivilized' people of Albania were incapable of an 
'independent existence'.  Thus, he claimed the Yugoslav state should be given 
northern Albania to play a 'civilizing' role there.122  A 1921 report by a Serbian 
Radical Party member from Kosovo states that the local Serbs developed the 'crazy 
idea' that 'Muslims will not be allowed to live in a Serbian state. On the basis of that 
idea, the local Serbs are committing various crimes against the Muslims.'123 
  
From 1918 to 1924, the new Kingdom fought against Kosovo Albanian 
guerillas that were supported by the Kosovo Committee in Albania.  The goal of the 
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Kosovo Committee was Albanian national unification, by military means if 
necessary.124 In 1921, in his speech to the League of Nations, the Prime Minister of 
Albania claimed that 'the Albanian nation has suffered cruelly from the 
dismemberment of which the country was victim in 1913'. 125  The Yugoslav Army 
used artillery in the attacks on the rebel-held villages, the property of the families of 
the Albanian rebels was often confiscated by the state, and the Army routinely sent 
families of the rebels into concentration camps.126 In 1924, the Yugoslav Army 
supported the establishment of a client regime in Tirana, which then quickly 
suppressed the Kosovo Committee. 127 Faced with the ruthless tactics of the Yugoslav 
military and without the support from the 'motherland', the Albanian guerilla in 
Kosovo soon lost military significance. 
 
 Throughout this long period of almost non-stop warfare in Kosovo, 
Macedonia, and parts of Albania, several Serbian politicians and intellectuals 
continued to criticize Serbian atrocities and its colonial policy. In 1911 a Serbian 
social-democrat Dragiša Lapčević argued: 'Our efforts must not be led astray by the 
anger of the chauvinists …. who in a chorus numbering one hundred thousand 
madmen demand a 'great empire' of this or that ancient ruler.' 128 During the 1913 
Serbian invasion of Albania, social-democrats Kosta Novaković and Dimitrije 
Tucović criticized the Serbian Army’s repression of the Albanian civilian population. 
129 Dragiša Vasić, a moderate conservative and a Yugoslav military officer on duty in 
Albania and later secretary of the elite Serbian Cultural Club, saw the crimes 
committed in 1921 and described 'poor Albania' as 'our shame' in which Serbian 
soldiers 'die defending plunderers and criminals.' 130 In 1921, Stojan Protić moderated 
his reported previous views and suggested that Kosovo and Sandžak should become 
one Muslim-majority province. 131 Still, as Lapčević’s earlier statement aptly 
illustrates, it seems that the majority of the politically active Serbs were supportive of 
the colonial policy towards the Albanians.  
 
The Failure of the Colonial Policy, 1924-1929  
With the consolidation of the new Kingdom during the 1920s, there were 
some attempts and successes in including Albanians into the political party  system. 
Just to be on the safe side, careful gerrymandering before the 1920 elections for the 
Constitutional Assembly ensured that Serbs outnumbered Albanians in all electoral 
units. 132 Nevertheless, by 1924 the Albanian and Turkish party Cemiyet was in 
coalition with the (Serbian) Radical Party and had 14 MPs in parliament. 133  
However, once the leaders of the Radical Party concluded that Cemiyet was secretly 
pursuing a secessionist policy, they broke off the coalition and had the leader of 
Cemiyet arrested. Cemiyet was defeated in 1925 parliamentary elections and stopped 
functioning the same year. 134 A major chance to incorporate genuine Albanian 
representatives in the parliamentary life of the Yugoslav state was thus lost. 
 
The long lasting Albanian guerrilla warfare probably confirmed a belief that 
the Albanians were hopelessly disloyal. A 1924 Police Report provides a memorable 
description of the Albanians: 'The Arnauts [Albanians] live in many municipalities of 
southern Serbia -- brutal, primitive, distrustful, smart, and disloyal people.' 135 While 
it is probably true that the Albanians were not loyal to the Serb-dominated state, it is 
hard to imagine that it could have been otherwise, given the way that the state had 
treated them in 1878, in 1912 and again in the 1920s. In this case the assumptions of 
disloyalty had a tendency to work as a self-fulfilling prophecy.  The Serbian elite 
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seemed unable to understand that the loyalty of Albanian minority could be 
unconditionally demanded, but has to be earned and maintained with negotiations and 
fair treatment.  
 
In 1924, Albanian émigré organizations appealed to the League of Nations to 
enforce the Minority Treaties and to protect the Albanian minority in Kosovo. The 
official response of the Yugoslav Royal representatives deserves to be quoted at 
length: 
If one could trust to the authors of the petition, it would seem that the 
 Royal government threatens the survival, the material welfare, and the 
cultural life of the peaceful and civilized Albanian population. However,  
that population is neither peaceful nor civilized. It lacks national  
consciousness, and it is only capable and willing to work as hired 
murderers.136  
 
Even after such a scandalous response there were no sanctions imposed on the 
Yugoslav Royal government. The central problem was probably a lack of 
commitment of the Great Powers to the enforcement of minority rights, especially in 
the cases where the offenders were the local client states. In 1925, the British Foreign 
Secretary observed that the minority treaties serve only to 'keep alive the differences 
which otherwise might be healed in time.' Thus, in these circumstances the treaties 
were hardly 'anything but an evil for all concerned'. 137  
 
Probably to ensure that Albanian national consciousness did not develop, the 
Yugoslav government prevented the opening of Albanian-language schools in 
Kosovo. 138 During the inter war period, the illiteracy rate for the Yugoslav Albanians 
remained at 90 percent. 139 From 1919 to 1941 Macedonia and Kosovo remained 
under the direct ministerial administration of Belgrade. 140  
 
The government tried to 'improve' the ethnic composition of Kosovo by 
promoting colonization policies, such as the confiscation of Albanian land and 
introduction of the Serbian and Montenegrin settlers. 141 The combination of 
discrimination, repression, and colonization did produce some of the desired results. 
By 1921 about 40,000 Kosovo Albanians had left for Albania, and by 1930 another 
45,000 left for Turkey. 142 By the late 1930s about 60,000 colonists, mostly Serbs, 
were introduced into Kosovo. 143 However, according to the official Yugoslav census 
data, the ethnic-cultural composition of Kosovo showed only minor changes. In 1921, 
about 27% of Kosovo inhabitants reported Serbian or Croatian mother tongue and  
65 % reported Albanian mother tongue. By 1931, 33% reported one Slavic mother 
tongue and about 60% reported Albanian mother tongue.  144  
 
Why did the Serbian policy in the 1920s shift from policed deportations (as in 
the 1830s or in 1878) to a more gradual colonization? A possible reason might be the 
radically different demographic make up of the newly acquired region. The estimates 
of the 'national' identity of the populations have to be taken cautiously, but it does 
seem that Serbia's more recent territorial acquisitions could hardly be seen as 
'Serbian-majority' areas. While the Belgrade Pashalik before 1804 was reported to be 
about 90% Serbian, and the Toplica and Kosanica regions were about 80% Serbian 
before 1878, in 1921 Serbs and Montenegrins comprised at most 40 % of the 
population of Kosovo. 145 In addition, with the establishment of a client regime in 
Tirana in 1924, the Belgrade authorities were probably less likely to see Kosovo 
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Albanians as a major secessionist or security threat. However, the growing influence 
of the fascist Italy in Albania would soon force the Belgrade elite to re-think its policy 
on the Kosovo Albanian question.  
 
Planning the Cleansing of Kosovo from the Albanians, 1929-1940 
  
As the transition from democracy to right wing authoritarianism spread across 
Eastern Europe, leading Serbian intellectuals and politicians of the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia developed increasingly exclusionary plans for the Albanian minority. In 
1929, King Alexander proclaimed a Royal dictatorship and implemented a set of 
measures aimed at a speedy creation of a unified Yugoslav nation, basically modeled 
after the French one.  The country was divided into new administrative areas, 
banovine, which ignored almost all existing ethnic boundaries. 146  Conveniently, the 
boundaries of the new ‘banovine’ ensured that none had a Slavic Muslim or Albanian 
majority. 147 Kosovo region was divided among three different banovine. 148  
  
In the 1930s Milan Stojadinović' conservative right government made major 
attempts at reconciliation and power sharing with several non-Serb groups. 
Stojadinović carefully distanced himself from the coercive ‘ethnic amalgamation’ 
ideas and policies of King Alexander, 149 and brought leading Slovenian and Bosnian 
Muslim politicians into his government. He also removed Serbian hardliner General 
Živković, who objected to the partnership with the Muslims. 150 However, 
Stojadinović's government also planned to bring the anti-Albanian policies to a new 
extreme.  
Probably the most infamous articulation of the anti-Albanian sentiments of the 
Serbian elite in this period was the 1937 proposal from Vaso Čubrilović, the Secretary 
of the elite Serbian Cultural Club, regarding the cleansing of Kosovo Albanians. 151 
Čubrilović argued that, 'in the 20th century, only a country inhabited by its own 
people can be confident of its security'.152 Thus, the Albanian 'wedge' in Kosovo 
represent a major threat to the security of the Yugoslav state. Assimilation is not a 
realistic option 'because they base themselves in Albania their national awareness is 
awakened'.153 Thus, 'if we do not settle the score with them at the proper time, within 
20-30 years we shall have to cope with terrible irredentism'.154   
  
The 'slow and sluggish gradual colonization policy' had failed to 
fundamentally shift the demographic composition of the region. As Protić reportedly 
argued in 1917, Čubrilović claimed that in the Balkans, 'European' approaches to the 
minority rights were entirely ineffectual: 'The fundamental mistake made by the 
[Serbian] authorities in charge at that time was that, forgetting where they were, they 
wanted to solve all the major ethnic problems of the troubled and bloody Balkans by 
Western methods'.155 More radical methods were needed. 'We hold the view that the 
only effective method for solving this problem is mass expulsion of the Albanians' 156 
There were already numerous examples of the effectiveness of this method. The 1878 
cleansing of Toplica and Kosanica demonstrated that the method worked. Moreover, 
'all the Balkan states, since 1912, have solved or are on the point of solving their 
problems with national minorities through mass population transfers'. 157 The Great 
Powers of Europe are doing this too: 
If Germany can re-settle tens of thousands of Jews, if Russia can move  
millions from one end of the continent to another, there will be no  
world war for the sake of a few hundred thousands re-settled Arnauts. 158  
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 Čubrilović goes into the detail in the elaboration of the policy, describing 
specific measures used against the Albanians in southern Serbia after 1878 in order to 
'create a new Toplica out of Kosovo'159.  The best lands should be taken away from 
Albanian peasants, taxes should be 'ruthlessly' collected, licenses of Albanian 
professionals should be revoked, etc. In addition, Serbian paramilitary units should be 
organized and secretly assisted by the state, and local riots should be incited and then 
suppressed by the local Serbian militias. Finally, the Albanian villages and city 
quarters should be secretly burned. 160   He continued, 'nationalizing the regions 
around Šar Mountain [Southern Kosovo and Western Macedonia] would mean that 
we can stifle irredentism once and for all, and ensure our control over these territories 
forever'. 161 
 
Čubrilović's idea is clearly intolerant to the extreme. His basic aim was to 
induce the Albanians to move, preferably to Turkey, by making their lives unbearable 
and by selective massacres of the Albanian civilians. In 1938, the Yugoslav Military 
HQ joined the ultra-nationalist intellectuals by advocating the resettlement of the 
ethnic Albanians into Turkey, as soon as possible. 162 The HQ was probably 
concerned with the growing Italian presence and influence in Albania, 163 which had 
the potential to turn 'disloyalty' of the Yugoslav Albanian minority into a 'security 
concern.' Possibly inspired by Čubrilović’s proposal and reflecting the spirit of the 
times elsewhere in Europe, Stojadinović signed an agreement with Turkey to accept 
40,000 Albanian families in 1938. 164 The Communist Party of Yugoslavia organized 
a protest by Belgrade University students against this eliminationist plan. 165 The 
agreement was not implemented at that point, due to a lack of funds.166  
  
Early in 1939, following discussions between Stojadinović and Count Ciano  
(the Italian Foreign Minister) the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared an 
internal analysis on the possible division of Albania between Italy and Yugoslavia. 167 
The analysis offers the following justification for the invasion and annexation of parts 
of Albania: 'The Albanians never showed solidarity with the other Balkan nations. As 
well, we never felt any sympathies for them'. 168 A section of the memorandum was 
written by Ivo Andrić, then Yugoslav diplomat and a later Nobel Prize winner for 
literature. Andrić advised against the annexation and also argued that it might be 
possible for the Yugoslav state to assimilate the Kosovo Albanian minority. In the 
context of the times and the intellectual climate, these were relatively enlightened 
ideas. However, he also does imply that if the Albanian state vanished, the out 
migration of the Muslim Albanians into Turkey -- presumably a goal of the 
Stojadinović government -- would be facilitated. 169  
 
Surprisingly, some of these eliminationist ideas would actually be put into 
practice by the multinational Yugoslav Communist regime. Vaso Čubrilović again 
wrote a memorandum in 1944, this time advocating massive deportations of all major 
non-Slavic minorities that 'proved' their disloyalty by massive collaboration with the 
fascist powers -- Germans, Hungarians, Italians, and of course, Albanians. Since this 
time he was addressing the Yugoslav Communists, Čubrilović was now using the 
'model' of Soviet cleansing of ethnic Germans and the 'population exchange' between 
Ukraine and Poland in 1944. 170 Indeed, the Yugoslav Communists did deport the 
German and the Italian minorities at the end of the war. 171  In the 1950s the Yugoslav 
Communists did implement the agreement with Turkey on the re-settlement of  
 16 
'Turks'. 172 Vaso Čubrilović, who died in 1990, joined the Serbian Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, an elite cultural institution that played a crucial role in the 1980s 
Serbian national mobilization173.  
 
Assimilate, Deport, or Kill: 
The Formation of the Cleansed National States at the Balkans 
 
Why were the Serbian goals and means of action towards the Albanians so 
exclusionary and why did they gradually worsen throughout the 19th and the early 
20th century? A simple answer would be to argue that a large part of the Serbian 
political elite was simply following the trends in continental European and regional 
thought and the policy of the times. In his analysis of the formation of national states 
in Western Europe, Charles Tilly notes that almost all successful states (i.e. those that 
survived) adopted some forms of deliberate cultural homogenization policies, such as 
the adoption of a state religion, expulsions of minorities, institution of a national 
language, and educational standardization. 174 The Ottoman system of non-territorial 
autonomies and tolerance for religious minorities effectively ensured that while 
Northwestern Europe was gradually culturally homogenized, Southeastern Europe 
remained without clear ethno-cultural boundaries.  
 
As a number of European nationalist movements radicalized towards fascism, 
175 the Serbian national programme gradually shifted from Garašanin's paternalistic 
'imperial restoration' towards Čubrilović' ethnic cleansing. As the early Balkan 
national states expanded into the political vacuum left by the collapsing empires, they 
encompassed ethnically diverse -- and potentially irredentist -- populations. The 
continued presence of these minorities was simply incompatible with the coercive 
utopia of a centralized and homogeneous nation-state. The alternative roads to 
modernity were beyond imagination. The minorities and ethnic pluralism had to 
become the victims of the utopia.  
 
It is tempting to argue that Miroslav Hroch's excellent account of the rise of 
minority nationalism in Eastern Europe fails to follow the process to its logical 
conclusion. Hroch distinguishes just the first three phases. Phase A is characterized by 
a scholarly interest and codification of history, language, and unique customs. In the 
Phase B, 'patriotic groups' use the definition of 'the people' from Phase A to 'awaken 
the nation', create national identity, and gain state recognition for the 'nation'. Finally, 
in Phase C, a mass national movement arises, especially if the ethnic activists manage 
to convincingly frame an existing conflict of interests as a 'national conflict'. 176 While 
this account seems to convincingly describe the formation of collective 'national' 
political identity of a number of minority nations, it does not provide systematic 
analysis of the developments of the minority national movements after they becoming 
the majority nationalisms -- that is, after they capture the state power.  
  
The formation of the national states in the Balkans appears to advance from 
the point where Hroch's account stops. A 'Phase D' might be the achievement of an 
independent state, usually at the 'core' and homogeneous ethnic territory (Serbia, 
Bulgaria and Montenegro before 1912, Romania before 1918). Early autonomous 
states were used as a stepping stone to a full independence by Romania, Serbia, 
Bulgaria, and Greece. 177   'Phase E' would then be the acquisition of new territories 
with mixed populations, usually following the collapse of the Empires. Here the focus 
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was on 'national unification' by territorial expansion. 178  For example, the pre-1918 
Romania was 90% ethnically homogeneous, but the territorial gains increased the 
percentage of the minorities to 27%. 179  Finally, 'Phase F' would be the coercive 
ethnic homogenization of the acquired territories, by assimilation, expulsion or mass 
murder. Following the collapse of empires, the new national regimes aimed to achieve 
unitary, ethnically cleansed polities. 180 Between 1911 and the first post-WWI census, 
Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria managed to dramatically reduce the Muslim 
population from the territories captured during the wars. From the Muslim population 
living there in 1911, by the early 1920s, 55% remained in Bulgaria, 46% in 
Yugoslavia, and only 17% in Greece. 181 From 1912 to 1922, about half a million 
Muslims, 1.5 million Greeks, and 250,000 Bulgarians [Orthodox Slavs] were 
'relocated' 182  
 Maria Todorova observes:  
 ...the Balkans were becoming European by shedding the last residue of an  
 imperial  legacy, widely considered anomaly at the time, and by assuming  
 and emulating the homogeneous European nation-state as the normative form  
 of social organization. It may well be that what we witness today [in the  
1990s], wrongly attributed to some Balkan essence, is the ultimate 
Europeanization of the Balkans. 183  
 
 While this line of reasoning does capture some of the reasons for the Serbian 
anti-Albanian ideas and policies, it still has major flaws. It downplays the crucial 
importance of Great Power politics on the ability of the Balkan nationalist leaders to 
pursue their coercive homogenization programmes. The major European Powers 
exercised crucial influence, initially by treating some of the atrocities against the 
Christians as 'humanitarian disasters' and simply ignoring the atrocities towards the 
Muslims, and later by frequently ignoring the violations of the minority rights by the 
local client states, including Yugoslavia. 
 Furthermore, the explanation that centers just on the nationalist ideology  
represents the Serbian political and cultural elite as unimaginative imitators, whose 
major fault was that they were not ahead of the rest of Europe. The situation was more 
complex. Even the most cursory look at the process of the formation of the Yugoslav 
state shows that the Serbian political elite was capable of designing and negotiating 
institutions and identities different from the standard nation-state model.  
 
Serb leaders were somewhat constrained in their thinking by the dominant 
ideas of their times, but when faced with complex realities they were able -- usually 
via the process of trial and error -- to come up with better solutions. The perception of 
the Croats gradually evolved from assimilationist 184 plans to the recognition of and 
the ethno-territorial autonomy for the Croat people in 1939. 185 While the Serbian elite 
denied Slavic Macedonians the right to define their own collective identity, they still 
focused on coercive assimilation instead of more exclusionary policies. Serbian 
policies were even less tolerant towards Slavic Muslims, and in several periods this 
group was subjected to coercive conversions, expulsions, and massacres. Yet, the 
Stojadinović regime was prepared to include the leading Bosnian Muslim politician 
Mehmed Spaho in the government, even if that meant alienating Serbian hard-liners, 
such as General Živković.  
  
The Yugoslav Albanians, however, were generally treated worse than the 
Slavic Muslims. They were neither recognized as one of the constitutive 'tribes' -- as 
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the Slovenians and the Croats eventually were -- nor were they seen as potentially 
'assimilable' into the Serbian nation  -- like the Macedonians and the Slavic Muslims. 
This is not to idealize the profoundly discriminatory policies of coercive assimilation 
and conversions towards the Macedonians and the Slavic Muslims. While the pressure 
to assimilate usually does indicate a strong sense of cultural superiority, it still allows 
for the possibility that the Others can become equal to Us, if they only make the 
effort.  
Thus, the important limitation of the argument which centers just on the 
coercive utopia of nation state is that it fails to explain why were some minorities 
singled out for assimilation and others for more exclusionary treatment?  Seemingly 
no amount of assimilation could turn Albanians into Serbs.   In the Serbian case, those 
minorities whose 'essential' character  was perceived as culturally distant (in terms of 
religion, language, and socio-economic development) and physically threatening (in 
terms of the previous history of conflict and the current presence of major foreign 
supporters) were more likely to be perceived as logical candidates for deportation or 
murder. 186 Thus, the nationalist elite's visions of the 'essential' characteristics of the 
Other determined which policies towards Them would appear as realistic and feasible.  
The perception of Albanians as unassimilable and barbarous was formed as a 
result of the persecution of the Kosovo Serbs by the Albanian extremists in the 1878-
1912 period. The recurring episodes of Kosovo Albanian massive support for the 
imperial invaders of Serbia -- first the Ottoman and later the Austrian Empire -- 
further strengthened the belief that they were an disloyal minority and a security 
threat.  
The Serbian elite's animosity towards the Albanians was built on a tradition of 
intolerance towards Albanians and Muslims. Tragically, in this tradition the 
commitment to the national liberation was fused with extreme intolerance towards the 
Balkan Muslims.  The new contributors to the tradition of intolerance were clearly 
building on the genealogy of ideas and actions created by their predecessors. Njegoš' 
verse looked back to the 1709 cleansing and he dedicated The Mountain Wreath to 
Karađorđe, who liberated but also cleansed Serbia from the 'Turks'. Hadži-Vasiljević 
justified the 1878 cleansing of Albanian Muslims with reference to Njegoš ideas. 
Čubrilović used the 1878 cleansing as a blueprint for his own proposal on Kosovo. 
Čubrilović's conceptualizations of Albanians as a 'wedge' in the Yugoslav lands 
influenced in turn the Serbian historian Dimitrije Bogdanović, who had a decisive 
impact in turn on the intellectual framing of the Kosovo crisis in the 1980s. 187 
Still, against the current, the counter-hegemonic discourse and practices also 
exist in this history. In the thoughts and lives of Marko Miljanov and Dimitrije 
Tucović, in the resistance of General Belimarković to the 1878 cleansing, in the 
Balkan federalist projects of Serbian social-democrats, in the demonstrations of 
Belgrade youth against the deportation of Albanians in 1938 -- the Montenegrins and 
the Serbs have a valuable heritage of a different vision of the Albanians: not as 
'inferior' or 'savages,' but as respected neighbors and fellow Balkan peoples.  
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